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THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CONUNDRUM
Eric Schnapper*

LIFE IN THE BALANCE: PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN CAPITAL
CASES. By Welsh S. White. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan
Press. 1984. Pp. xii, 289. $19.95.
After almost two decades of Supreme Court capital punishment
decisions, the time has certainly arrived for a comprehensive evaluation of the complex of interrelated problems that continue to embroil
and confound the Court. In the late 1960s, an intelligent observer
might have thought that the only unresolved constitutional issue
raised by the death penalty was whether such punishment violated the
eighth amendment. Today capital punishment has emerged as a major
branch of constitutional jurisprudence, encompassing questions regarding the right to jury trial, cruel and unusual punishment, and procedural and substantive due process. Virtually no one seems happy
with the results. Many members of the Supreme Court appear uncomfortable with the erratic pattern of that Court's decisions, and annoyed, at the least, with the persistence and diversity of the continuing
attacks on capital punishment procedures. Defense attorneys, on the
other hand, perceive in that pattern an increasing unwillingness on the
part of the Court to take seriously its responsibility to evaluate fairly
the methods by which states are deciding which defendants will live
and which are to die. Professor Hugo Bedau, in a foreword to this
book, accuses the Court of having "contributed at least as much obscurity as clarity to the basic moral and constitutional issues involved"
(p. vii). All three of these very different views find colorable support
in the case law.
Professor Welsh White, who has followed these developments
closely both as a litigator and as a scholar, has without question the
experience and analytic skill needed to write a book providing a valuable overview of this complex and evolving body oflaw. But, regrettably, he has not yet attempted to do so. Life in the Balance consists
largely of seven law review articles previously published by Professor
White between 1974 and 1984. In capital punishment law, where d~c
trines and Supreme Court majorities seem to shift annually, a tenyear-old legal analysis is often no more valuable a tool for understanding the present state of affairs, and predicting future developments,
• Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; Lecturer in Law,
Columbia University. B.A. 1962, M.A. 1963, Johns Hopkins University; B. Phil. 1965, Oxford
University; LL.B. 1968, Yale University. - Ed.
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than a ten-year-old scouting report on the Chicago Bears. White's
1974 commentary on the meaning of Furman v. Georgia, 1 for example,
may be most significant as an illustration of how much the 1976 decision in Gregg v. Georgia 2 was unforeseen by scholars and litigators
alike. Others of the articles demonstrate White's astuteness in predicting subsequent legal developments, but his 1976 article arguing that
capital punishment should not be imposed for the crime of rape, for
example, is necessarily less important reading than the Supreme
Court's 1977 decision3 on that subject. Substantially more current are
White's articles regarding police interrogation techniques and the use
of psychiatric testimony in capital cases, but these subjects are not at
the core of capital punishment debates or litigation. The most valuable part of Life in the Balance is the portion that White wrote for the
book itself-an introductory overview of the evolution of capital punishment law and a number of short "updates" of the earlier articles.
Professor Bedau quotes an attorney involved in capital punishment
litigation as observing, with regard to his practice, "We've become
technicians. The great moral issues have been removed from the legal
arena" (p. vii). For a reader unfamiliar with what has occurred in this
area of the law, White's analysis of some of those technical issues, particularly the problems of jury selection and psychiatric testimony in
capital cases, provides a flavor of the complex practical and legal issues in which capital litigation has become embroiled. But White offers no serious account of how capital punishment case law evolved, or
devolved, from the grand issues of Furman and Gregg to narrower and
more individualized disputes, such as that in Estelle v. Smith 4 regarding psychiatric testimony at sentencing hearings. White's articles,
Bedau suggests, demonstrate that the current state of the law is "little
more than an uneasy compromise among those who firmly refuse to
give up the death penalty altogether, others who would destroy executions root and branch once and for all, and still others whose strongest
commitment is . . . the desire to preserve federalism and state sovereignty" (p. vii). Were that the case, the current state and future course
of the so-called technical issues would be equally unintelligible. ; A
scholar who saw those three extreme positions as the only alternatives
would have little reason to analyze the emerging technical issues, other
than to seek to use those issues to support one of the extreme alternatives - arguing, for example, that a particular technical issue is insolvable, and thus dictates abandonment of capital punishment
altogether.
White does not pursue any such nihilistic approach, but his analyI.
2.
3.
4.

408 U.S.
428 U.S.
Coker v.
451 U.S.

238 (1972).
153 (1976).
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
454 (1981).
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ses do not attempt to offer an account of why the middle of the Court
continues to avoid all three of the extreme positions described by
Bedau, rejecting some arguments against particular death sentences,
agreeing with others, all the while spawning new issues that seem increasingly narrow and complex. Proponents and opponents of capital
punishment both have institutional interests in avoiding any effort to
articulate an intermediate view, since their own arguments are
strengthened by asserting that the only alternative to their position is,
respectively, abolition of capital punishment for even the most vile of
offenses, or the slaughter of hundreds of defendants selected from
among many other equally culpable murderers on an arbitrary or even
racial basis. But litigators who must practice in the present legal environment remain in need of some general analysis, broader than
White's discussions of specific issues, of what the middle of the
Supreme Court is doing and where it may be headed.
The case law sketched by Professor White suggests that the
Supreme Court has indeed recognized the existence of many of the
constitutional problems of which he complains. The Court has chosen, not to adopt the sort of broad per se rules which would guarantee
an end to any constitutional violations, but to afford the states a
chance to develop procedures that will be free of the identified constitutional vices. This compromise has taken two somewhat distinct
forms. First, as I discuss in Part I, the Court in Gregg and its progeny
has given the states an opportunity to develop general sentencing procedures that may in practice prove free of the arbitrariness condemned
in Furman; disputes regarding whether particular procedures have
met that goal have inevitably become, and are likely to remain, an
ongoing source of litigation. Second, the Court has permitted the
states to adjust certain practices on a case-by-case basis in order to
avoid violations of identified constitutional rights; Part II describes the
manner in which this apprpach has predictably led to a large number
of meritorious or at least colorable appeals.
I.

THE GREGG EXPERIMENT

The legal development that seems to exemplify best what both proponents and opponents of capital punishment object to is the apparent
shift in the law from Furman to Gregg. In 1972 Furman struck down
capital punishment as that penalty was then administered, holding
that the number of individuals condemned to death, and actually executed, was so small that the selection of those who were to die was
both arbitrary and freakish. In Furman, as in a number of later cases,
there was no majority opinion. Justice Stewart, who apparently provided the swing vote, explained that "[t]hese death sentences are cruel
and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel
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and unusual." 5 Because all members of the Furman majority emphasized that the states condemned to death only a small proportion of
the defendants who committed capital offenses, many commentators,
Professor White among them, assumed that, if the Supreme Court
were to uphold any future capital punishment statutes, the Court
would require that the statutes make that penalty mandatory (pp. 2425).

Gregg and its companion cases, decided in 1976, held precisely the
opposite, concluding that mandatory capital punishment statutes were
unconstitutional per se. 6 Those decisions upheld capital punishment
statutes in Georgia, Texas, and Florida that expressly conferred on
juries discretion to decide whether a defendant was to live or die, and
that established various types of standards to "guide" juries in the exercise of that discretion. 7 Justices White and Rehnquist subsequently
characterized Gregg's rejection of anything smacking of a mandatory
sentence as a complete reversal of the principles of Furman. 8 Death
penalty critics, on the other hand, saw little basis for believing that the
statutes approved in Gregg would, in operation, be any less arbitrary
than the practice condemned in Furman; to them Gregg simply
marked an abandonment of the principles of Furman, a callous and
calculated decision to reinstate the death penalty regardless of how
arbitrary its application might be.
Subsequent decisions seemed to confirm those fears. The plurality
opinion in Gregg had emphasized that the Georgia statute contained
an express provision requiring systematic appellate review of particular death sentences to assure that they were proportionate to sentences
imposed in other cases. In Pulley v. Harris 9 the petitioner challenged
the California capital punishment statute on the ground that it lacked
any such provision for proportionality review; the Court held that, at
least in the context of the specific California statute at issue, no such
review procedure was constitutionally required. Similarly, the Gregg
plurality, in rejecting claims that the death penalty was cruel and unusual, emphasized that juries, which were presumed to reflect community values, continued to vote to impose that penalty; subsequently, in
Spaziano v. Florida, 10 however, the Court held that a state judge could
constitutionally sentence a defendant to death even though the jury
had voted against that sentence. Both Pulley and Spaziano stressed
that the Court was unwilling to establish any one system for imposing
5. 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
6. Mandatory death penalties were held unconstitutional in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
7. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
8. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 622 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); 438 U.S. at 631 (Rehn·
quist, J., dissenting).
9. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
10. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
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the death penalty, and in both decisions the Court noted that it was
rejecting the claims involved only under the specific circumstances of
those particular cases.
Professor White has no doubt that all capital punishment laws will
be as arbitrary and freakish in their application as the statutes condemned in Furman. Statutes such as that approved in Gregg, he
writes, contain guidelines "so broad and amorphous as to have the
effect of vesting the capital sentencer with almost the same total discretion that the pre-Furn1an statutes vested in the sentencing jury." 11
Any system that permits prosecutors to refrain from seeking the death
penalty, or allows juries to avoid the possibility of such a sentence by
convicting a particular defendant of a lesser offense, White argues,
"will exhibit all of the vices that Furman found antithetical to the values of the Eighth Amendment" (p. 25). Gregg and its progeny seem to
require both that a jury have sufficiently broad discretion to assure
that any sentencing decision is based on the particular circumstances
of each individual case, and that the exercise of any jury discretion be
so circumscribed by "guidelines" as to assure that the imposition of
the death penalty is reasonably uniform and predictable. 12 Professor
White insists that these two requirements are so clearly inconsistent
that no statute could possibly satisfy both (pp. 3-4).
Gregg can be understood, at least in part, as premised on a rejection of precisely the sort of analysis that Professor White offers of this
problem. Professor Bedau, in a passage that was apparently intended
to convey approval, describes White's methodology as "general and
theoretical, as well as jurisprudential; hence narratives or case studies
or statistically oriented investigations cannot suffice for his purposes"
(p. vi). Gregg does not profess any abandonment of Furman's concern
about the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty; 13 what Gregg refuses to do is to predict on the basis of "general and theoretical, as well
as jurisprudential" grounds that no guided discretion statute could
possibly avoid such arbitrariness. Furman's condemnation of the capital sentencing laws of that era was based on several decades of actual
experience with those statutes, not on any theoretical assumptions
about how such statutes might operate. Despite some loose language,
Gregg appears to leave open the possibility that one or more guided
discretion statutes might prove as arbitrary in practice as the statutes
11. Pp. 30-31. Elsewhere White predicts that the existence of statutory standards to guide
juries in their selection of sentences "will neither alter the fundamentally discretionary character
of capital sentencing nor change the pattern of rare, arbitrary, and freakish death penalties condemned by Furman." P. 3.
12. The Supreme Court described its decisions as pursuing such "twin objectives" in Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 459-60.
13. On a number of occasions since Gregg the Court has reiterated that a capital punishment
statute would be unconstitutional if in practice those who were to die were selected in an arbitrary and unpredictable manner. See, e.g., Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 459-60 & n.7.
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disapproved in Furman, and White himself reads Gregg to reserve resolution of that issue for some future date. 14
Gregg may reflect a refusal by the Court to predict that every conceivable guided discretion capital punishment statute would be unavoidably arbitrary and freakish in its application, and a decision to
afford the states a reasonable opportunity to attempt to devise one or
more sentencing schemes that would in operation be free of the vice
condemned in Furman. A court concerned with affording the states
such an opportunity would be understandably reluctant to sweep aside
practices of general application that might be an essential part of a
sentencing scheme, which, taken as a whole, significantly reduced the
degree of arbitrariness present in Furman. Thus, although the practice upheld in Spaziano may well be, as Professor Gillers has argued, 15
inconsistent with the sixth or eighth amendments, it is possible that
permitting judges to overrule jury recommendations of life imprisonment may in time be shown to increase the degree of uniformity in the
administration of the death sentence in Florida. If the Supreme Court
takes seriously its commitment to Furman, it cannot permit the states
to continue indefinitely to devise whatever schemes they please, however bizarre and constitutionally suspect, for administering the death
penalty. But a certain interval for a reasonable degree of diversity and
experimentation may be important to identifying the types of schemes
that best reduce the degree of arbitrariness that existed in the past, or
to establishing that no satisfactory scheme can in fact be fashioned.
Although Professor White makes no effort to evaluate what actual
experience has shown about the operation of guided discretion statutes, the Supreme Court is increasingly in a position to do so. Within
the last year two detailed and sophisticated sentencing studies have
been published, one conducted by Professor Arnold Barnett of M.I.T.,
and a second by Professors David Baldus, George Woodworth, and
Charles Pulaski, Jr. 16 The two studies, using quite distinct methodolo14. P. 15. In Spaziano the Court commented that "it is to be hoped that current procedures
have greatly reduced the risk that jury sentencing will result in arbitrary or discriminatory appli·
cation of the death penalty, see Gregg v. Georgia." 468 U.S. at 460. This passage seems to
indicate that a capital defendant could seek to establish that the hope on which Gregg was based
had proved unfounded. The Court upheld the death penalty in Spaziano in part because it saw
"nothing that suggests that the •.. procedure has resulted in arbitrary or discriminatory application of the death penalty, either in general or in this particular case." 468 U.S. at 466.
The Court's decision in Pulley also appears to leave open the possibility that actual experience
might demonstrate that a guided discretion statute was in fact as arbitrary and capricious as the
statutes condemned in Furman: "Any capital sentencing scheme may occasionally produce aberrational outcomes. Such inconsistencies are a far cry from the major systemic defects identified
in Furman. . . . As we are presently informed, we cannot say that the California procedures
provided ... inadequate protection against the evil identified in Furman." 465 U.S. at 54 (em·
phasis added).
15. Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 39-74 (1980).
16. Barnett, Some Distribution Patterns for the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C.D. L. REV.
1327 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Barnett Study]; Baldus, Woodworth & Pulaski, Monitoring and
Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing Systems; Lessons From Georgia, 18 U.C.D. L. REV.
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gies and analyzing over 500 cases each, arrived at strikingly similar
conclusions.17 Amongst all defendants convicted of murder, the proportion ultimately sentenced to death averages less than twenty percent.18 That proportion is clearly small enough to raise questions
under Furman, absent substantial evidence that those condemned to
death are in fact being selected in a reasonably uniform and predictable manner. The studies further indicate, however, that in certain
types of cases the probability that a defendant will be sentenced to
death is predictably high; both studies wen~ able to identify circumstances in which two-thirds or more of all defendants would receive
that sentence. 19 That high probability exists in certain categories of
cases despite the exercise of discretion by prosecutors in deciding what
crime to charge and what sentence to seek, and despite the ability of
the jury not only to fix the sentence but also to convict a defendant of a
lesser included offense. The application of the death penalty to this
group involves a situation that is, to say the least, radically different
from the situation condemned in Furman or the result predicted by
Professor White.
On the other hand, both studies found that a significant number of
death sentences were being imposed on defendants in circumstances in
which the death penalty was ordinarily extremely rare. The studies
demonstrated that approximately one-third of all death sentences were
being imposed under circumstances in which a majority of similarly
situated defendants were only sentenced to imprisonment, and that
about five percent of the death sentences were imposed in cases in
which ninety percent of similarly situated defendants were spared. 20
Neither study identified any circumstance or combination of circum.:.
stances that could explain why these particular defendants had been
singled out for execution, while apparently indistinguishable defendants received life sentences instead.21 With regard to this subset of
capital defendants, it appears that the states have not met their constitutional responsibility to "administer that penalty in a way that can
rationally distinguish between those individuals for whom death is an
1375 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Baldus Study]. An earlier version of the Baldus Study appeared
a year prior to the publication of Professor White's book. Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983).
17. The authors noted the striking similarity of the results they obtained. Barnett Study,
supra note 16, at 1361-62; Baldus Study, supra note 16, at 1397-99.
18. Barnett Study, supra note 16, at 1343; Baldus Study, supra note 16, at 1396.
19. Barnett Study, supra note 16, at 1342; Baldus Study, supra note 16, at 1396.
20. These figures are calculated by combining the categories of defendants in each study who
were guilty ofnonheinous crimes. See Barnett Study, supra note 16, at 1342; Baldus Study, supra
note 16, at 1396.
21. Barnett in particular emphasized his inability to identify any explanation for why these
defendants had been given the death penalty. Barnett Study, supra note 16, at 1345-46, 1352-53.
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appropriate sanction and those for whom it is not." 22
The decision in Gregg was based on the assumption that prosecutors and juries were limiting the application of the death penalty to
"extreme cases," and on a holding that capital punishment was appropriate in precisely such circumstances. The available data suggests
that the Court's prediction is accurate regarding a substantial number
of the instances in which the death penalty is being imposed. The
types of situations in which juries will ordinarily impose the death
penalty are cases that a judge or ordinary citizen might well characterize as particularly egregious. 23 The Barnett study found that the three
critical factors for predicting whether a defendant would receive the
death penalty were: (1) whether the murder was premeditated; (2)
whether the victim was a stranger; and (3) whether the murder was
committed in a particularly horrendous manner. 24 Where two of these
three factors were present, well over fifty percent of the defendants
were ultimately sentenced to death. This data strongly indicates that a
significant number of the defendants sentenced to death would have
received that sentence regardless of the judge, jury, or prosecutor involved in the case.
But it is equally clear that a substantial number of defendants have
been sentenced to death in circumstances in which a majority of similarly situated defendants are not being given capital sentences. The
decision regarding who among defendants committing nonextreme offenses will live or die appears to be neither predictable nor intelligible;
the statutory sentencing standards that may have produced some uniformity in the treatment of the most extreme cases have evidently
failed to bring about any coherent treatment of other defendants. The
imposition of the death penalty on a small minority of the defendants
22. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984).
23. It may not be fortuitous that the disposition of capital punishment cases in the Supreme
Court appears to correlate with the egregiousness of the crime involved. Compare Baldwin v.
Alabama, 105 S. Ct. 2727, 2729-30 (1985) (victim sodomized, raped, stabbed, choked, and run
over with car; death sentence affirmed); Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 847 (1985) (premeditated killing of young boy, body sexually abused; death sentence affirmed); Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. 447, 450 (1984) (torture murder of two women; death sentence affirmed); and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1984) (three brutal stabbing murders, torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders, and attempted extortion and theft; death sentence
affirmed), with Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2647 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(victim killed when she screamed during robbery; death sentence reversed); Francis v. Franklin,
105 S. Ct. 1965, 1969 (1985) (victim killed when he slammed door, causing defendant to fire his
gun; conviction reversed); and Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1090-91 (1985) (delusional
defendant who believed that he was the Lord's "sword of vengeance"; death sentence and conviction reversed because indigent defendant did not have assistance of psychiatrist). On retrial Ake
was again convicted, but the jury voted not to impose the death penalty. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14,
1986, at A15, col. 1 (late ed.).
24. This is a very rough summary of the criteria used by Barnett. See Barnett Study, supra
note 16, at 1338-42, 1364-70; see also Baldus Study, supra note 16, at 1396 (criteria used in that
study).
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guilty of less egregious offenses appears to retain precisely the degree
of arbitrariness condemned in Furman.
If the Supreme Court is to reconcile the principles of Furman and
the assumptions underlying Gregg with actual experience under
guided discretion statutes, it will have to narrow the circumstances in
which capital punishment can be imposed to the types of cases in
which the likelihood of a capital sentence is fairly high, and in which
the danger that its imposition will be arbitrary is thus reasonably low.
Making that distinction will require some difficult judgments. A state
statute defining capital murder so broadly that only five percent of
those covered are actually sentenced to death clearly has not met that
standard; conversely, a statute that limits the death penalty to cases so
extreme that juries and prosecutors favor death in ninety percent of all
cases would not raise any obvious problem under Furman. There is,
however, no particular rate of imposition that marks a clear boundary
between uniformity and arbitrariness.
On the other hand, a substantial historical and constitutional precedent exist~ for Supreme Court action limiting the types of murder
cases in which the death penalty can be imposed in order to reduce the
arbitrariness in the imposition of that penalty. In eighteenth-century
England, defendants convicted of most felonies were technically subject to a mandatory death sentence. In reality, however, a host of
practices existed, chief among them a refusal by juries to return convictions for those offenses, which prevented the imposition of the
death penalty in most instances. The result was precisely the sort of
system condemned by Furman, one in which, for example, a handful
of unlucky horse thieves or forgers would die for an offense that ordinarily resulted only in imprisonment. The colonies and states, and
later England itself, responded to this situation by redefining what
conduct was to be treated as a capital offense, generally limiting that
penalty to murder, the crime that prosecutors and juries in 1800 apparently regarded as ordinarily warranting the death penalty. Later in
that century, when juries began to balk at imposition of the death penalty for all homicides, recognizing that some killings were less culpable
than others, the states responded by delineating several different degrees of murder, limiting capital punishment to the most extreme
forms of the offense.
It would doubtless be possible to narrow again the definition of
capital murder to the categories of cases in which the death penalty is
imposed in a substantial portion, a majority for example, of all prosecutions. The California death penalty statute upheld in Pulley 25 was
framed to narrow substantially the types of murder cases in which the
imposition of the death penalty could even be considered by thejury, 26
25. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
26. See 465 U.S. at 51 n.13. The Court in Pulley emphasized, in upholding that statute, that
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and thus. precluded California juries from considering, and doubtless
deterred California prosecutors from even seeking, the death penalty
in some of the types of cases in which its imposition in other jurisdictions is technically possible but a practical rarity. Even in the face of
evidence that restrictions such as those in the Pulley statute are needed
to comply with Furman, however, the Court may balk at announcing
a constitutional rule with the degree of specificity necessary to distinguish between cases in which the death penalty is regularly applied
and cases in which it is only infrequently utilized.
The Court has other means available to it, however, for moving
toward the same result; indeed, even if the Court declines to face up to
the Furman-Gregg problem as such, other constitutional principles
will tend to lead to a similar result. Writing in 1976, Professor White
correctly foresaw that the Court would declare unconstitutional the
imposition of the death penalty for rape, as it did the next year in
Coker v. Georgia. 27 In Coker the Court reasoned that the rare imposition of the death penalty for rape demonstrated that capital punishment was widely regarded as a disproportionate sanction for a crime
other than murder. As White observes, under both Coker and the subsequent decision in Enmund v. Florida, 28 the actual practice of juries
in deciding whether to impose the death penalty in a particular category of cases is of vital if not decisive significance in assessing whether,
measured by community values, the imposition of the death penalty
for that category of cases is excessive and thus constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment (pp. 13, 95). The Barnett and Baldus studies provide precisely the sort of information to which Coker and Enmund
attach critical significance. It appears, for example, that the imposition of the death penalty for an unpremeditated murder arising out of
a lover's quarrel or barroom brawl is as rare as the imposition of the
death penalty for rape or for a felony murder involving no intent to
kill. In Coker the Court thought that the imposition of the death penalty in less than one of ten rape cases demonstrated the disproportionality of the death sentence for that particular crime. If the Court were
to apply to various types of murder the standards of Coker and Enmund, it would be compelled to conclude that the death penalty was
generally regarded by juries as excessive, and was thus unconstitutional, in a variety of specific types of cases. Over time a series of such
decisions would narrow the types of cases in which a state could impose the death penalty to those in which experience demonstrated that
the penalty is imposed with a substantial degree of frequency.
it limited "the death sentence to a small subclass of capital-eligible cases." 465 U.S. at 53. The
categories of capital murder delineated by the California statute in Pulley are significantly
broader than the categories in which actual experience shows the death penalty is regularly
applied.
27. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
28. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
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A similar narrowing, albeit an indirect and erratic one, is likely to
follow from the Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington. 29
Strickland holds that a defendant who has been denied effective assistance of counsel is not entitled to have his conviction or sentence overturned unless there is a substantial reason to believe that the denial of
counsel affected the outcome of the trial or sentencing proceeding. 30
In Strickland itself, the Court denied such relief because it regarded
the evidence as so overwhelming in support of the prosecution that
any denial of effective assistance of counsel was unlikely to have affected the outcome of the proceeding. 31 The available sentencing stud- ·
ies make it possible to delineate the categories of cases in which the
likelihood that the death penalty would be imposed is well under half,
and in many instances under one in ten. In cases of this sort it will
never be possible to say with assurance that a denial of effective counsel might not have affected the resulting sentence; on the contrary,
precisely because the imposition of the death penalty in these categories of cases is essentially inexplicable, any constitutional error, no
matter how slight, might well have been the difference between a sentence of death and a sentence of imprisonment. Thus the criteria fashioned by Barnett and Baldus to define cases in which the death penalty
is only rarely imposed also delineate a group of cases in which virtually any constitutional error at the sentencing stage would be reversible error. Because, as Professor White notes, ineffective assistance of
counsel is particularly likely to be a problem in capital cases (pp. 1314), a conscientious consideration of such claims in light of Strickland
is likely to lead to reversals of death sentences in many of the types of
cases in which that sentence was unlikely.
The courts will be impelled toward the same result if they come to
take seriously the evidence that whether or not a defendant is sentenced to death is often affected by the race of the defendant and that
of his victim. The Supreme Court has already recognized that the discretion inherent in the administration of a capital punishment statute
provides "a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected."32 Initial empirical studies of capital cases as a
whole indicate that the likelihood of a death sentence is substantially
higher if the victim was white or the killer black. 33 The more refined
Barnett and Baldus studies have confirmed and qualified that conclusion. The decision to impose the death penalty does not correlate significantly with race in those extreme cases in which the death penalty
29. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
30. 466 U.S. at 694.
31. 466 U.S. at 700.
32. Turner v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (1986).
33. See Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980); Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death
Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1981).
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is almost always, or almost never, imposed. But in the intermediate
cases, where the death penalty is imposed occasionally but not ordinarily, the correlation of that sentence with the race of the victim and
perpetrator is not only pronounced, but substantially greater than was
initially perceived to be the case for capital punishment cases as a
whole. 34 Thus the more conservative response to this evidence of racial discrimination in sentencing would be not to abolish the death
penalty.in all cases, but rather to forbid the use of that penalty in those
marginal cases in which the decision is likely to tum on race.
The interconnection of these issues demonstrates the danger of a
"general theoretical" approach to capital punishment issues. On their
face the decisions in Gregg, Coker, and Strickland seem unrelated to
one another or to the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination. Viewed in light of actual sentencing experience, however, the
principles and implementation of these decisions tend to converge.
That convergence may be of considerable practical importance in at
least the short term. Whatever the original rationale of Gregg, in the
last decade a majority of the Supreme Court has been extremely resistant to any argument that might result in the invalidation for essentially procedural reasons of a large number of existing death sentences.
In 1972 the fact that hundreds of defendants faced execution seems to
have contributed to the decision in Furman effectively striking down
every capital punishment statute then in existence; today the prospect
that a significant number of death row inmates might escape execution
appears to militate against sustaining constitutional challenges to a
specific death sentence or procedure. But while a general reconsideration of Gregg seems unlikely for the present, despite the existence of
the type of evidence unavailable in 1976, the Court has remained willing to consider arguments that the imposition of the death penalty on
a specific individual or group of individuals is excessive, or carries with
it an undue risk of error. 35 Thus while the Court seems inclined to
overlook procedural problems rather than reverse the sentences of defendants who have committed particularly heinous crimes, it has been
more scrupulous in reviewing claims that the imposition of the death
penalty in less egregious cases may have been unwarranted: 36 Devel34. Barnett Study, supra note 16, at 1350-51; Baldus Study, supra note 16, at 1399-406.
35. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985) (argument by prosecutor that
appellate courts will reconsider a death sentence); Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985)
(denial of assistance of psychiatrist to indigent defendant whose sanity was clearly in doubt).
36. Although the Court does not openly acknowledge applying such a distinction, a number
of its decisions are difficult to explain on any other basis. For example, in Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625 (1980), the Court overturned the death sentence of a defendant who had participated in
a burglary during which his accomplice, apparently without premeditation or warning, struck
and killed their victim. In explaining that decision the Court noted that Alabama law directed
the jury to return the death penalty in such cases, while leaving the ultimate determination of the
sentence to the trial judge; the majority observed that it was "manifest that the jury's verdict
must have a tendency to motivate the judge to impose the same sentence that the jury did." 447
U.S. at 645. Five years later the constitutionality of that statute was challenged on the ground
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opments in this area may thus be most likely to follow from application of the principles of Coker and Enmund to other types of cases in
which the imposition of the death penalty is in practice relatively rare.
The continuing innovation by the states of new procedures for administering capital punishment statutes, together with the emerging
body of information regarding the impact of those practices, will necessarily spawn an ongoing series of constitutional issues.

II.

THE WITHERSPOON EXPERIENCE

In Witherspoon v. ll/inois 37 the Supreme Court fashioned a quite
different type of compromise between vindicating constitutional principles and respecting a state's interest in the retention of capital punishment. Witherspoon recognized that the wholesale exclusion of
veniremen who had reservations about the death penalty could result
in the creation of a hanging jury uncommonly likely to favor the execution of a capital defendant. Rather than simply prohibit any inquiry
into a venireman's attitude towards capital punishment, however, the
Court in Witherspoon attempted to draw a fine line delineating precisely which jurors could and could not be excused for cause. Witherspoon limited such exclusions to those jurors who stated that they
would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty
regardless of the evidence, and those whose attitude toward the death
penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to a
defendant's guilt. 38 Thus the process of striking the balance between a
defendant's interest in a constitutionally selected jury and a prosecutor's desire to impose the death penalty was left for implementation on
a case-by-case basis. In the years since Witherspoon prosecutors have
sought in virtually every capital case to remove jurors for cause based
on their views regarding the death penalty, and arguments that such
exclusions were unconstitutional have been the single most common
issue in capital punishment appeals. 39
Professor White correctly observes that "the lower courts have had
enormous difficulty in administering" Witherspoon's distinction between jurors with only general conscientious or religious scruples and
that it made a mandatory jury verdict part of the sentencing process. The defendant at issue had
been charged with raping and sodomizing his victim, and then killing her by stabbing her, choking her, running her over with a car, and then cutting her throat with a hatchet. A majority of
the Court, in upholding the death sentence imposed on that defendant, held that it "defie[d] logic
to assume that a judge will be swayed to impose the death penalty" because the jury, in compliance with state law, had included such a sentence in its verdict. Baldwin v. Alabama, 105 S. Ct.
2727, 2736 (1985).
37. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
38. 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
39. See generally Schnapper, Taking Witherspoon Seriously: The Search for Death-Qualified
Jurors, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 977 (1984).
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jurors who would automatically vote against the death penalty regardless of the evidence presented at trial:
The line that separates these two groups of veniremen is not very clear.
A prospective juror may be absolutely opposed to capital punishment
but still feel that there might be some case in which she would at least
want to consider the evidence before deciding whether to vote against
the death penalty. In this type of situation, the distinction between opposing the death penalty and automatically voting against it may be too
subtle for ordinary minds to grasp. [p. 4].

The theoretical distinction established by Witherspoon was indeed to
spawn philosophical and jurisprudential issues that would sorely test
the analytic skill, if not the patience, of the most ingenious academic.
The application of Witherspoon in the real world has been even
more difficult. Even if it had proved possible to agree on what types of
scruples fall on which side of the constitutional boundary, actual jurors have simply proved unable in a large µumber of cases to delineate
their views in the detail, or with the certainty, that Witherspoon seems
to require. Some jurors candidly admit under questioning that they
simply do not know how they would act if called upon to consider
imposition of the death penalty. An even larger number have expressed uncertainty as to the precise nature of their views, or have
given different answers to the often differently phrased questions asked
by the prosecution and defense. 40 The process of administering
Witherspoon has been compounded by the identity of the personnel
involved. Although the legal and practical problems raised by Witherspoon are enormously complex, defense attorneys in capital cases have
only occasionally had any significant prior experience with death penalty litigation, and ordinarily have no familiarity with Witherspoon issues. The types of questions, arguments, and objections that might aid
implementation of Witherspoon are thus only rarely raised by defense
counsel. State court trial judges, who often sit on a wide variety of
civil and criminal cases, typically have little understanding of or experience with Witherspoon issues. Prosecutors, of course, are likely to be
more familiar with these problems, but their interest lies in excluding
as many scrupled jurors as possible, not in faithfully adhering to the
commands of Witherspoon; thus prosecutors will naturally object for
cause to almost any scrupled jurors, and judges and defense counsel
have often been ill equipped to deal with the complex issues raised by
such objections.
After seventeen years of experience with Witherspoon it was apparent to judges and lawyers alike that the theoretical and practical difficulties raised by it were calling into question the constitutionality of
many, perhaps even most, death sentences. Against that background
40. See id. at 993-1032.
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the Supreme Court attempted in Wainwright v. Witt 41 to refashion the
balance that had been struck by Witherspoon between constitutional
and nonconstitutional values. Rather than articulate a distinction between excludable and nonexcludable jurors so clear that state courts
would only rarely violate the rule, however, the Court in Witt chose
simply to shift the vague boundary so as to reduce the number of
nonexcludable jurors.
In the long term Witt is likely to compound rather than eliminate
the problems that Professor White identified in the administration of
Witherspoon. The new standard announced by Witt is that a juror
may be excused for cause if his or her views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance
with his instructions and his oath."42 Under Witherspoon the inquiry
focused on whether a juror would never vote for the death penalty no
matter what the evidence; a juror might well be uncertain as to the
nature of his views, but at least he would have had a reasonable idea
what it meant to "never vote for the death penalty." But a juror asked
in the words of Witt whether his views would "prevent or substantially
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath" might well have no idea what that question
meant. A juror could not assess the possible inconsistency of his views
with his "duties," "instructions," and "oath" unless he was told what
those duties, oath, and instructions would be. The nature of a juror's
duty, oath, and instructions with regard to the penalty phase of a trial
varies from state to state; a juror's scruples might be inconsistent with
his duty in Texas, with his oath in Florida, or with his instructions in
Alabama, but be entirely consistent with his legal obligations in California or some other state. Only by explaining to a venireman in detail
the substance of the oath and instructions that will be given to the
jury, or by focusing questions on specific aspects of that oath or those
instructions, will it be possible to ascertain whether the venireman's
scruples would prevent or substantially impair obedience to one or
more specific portions of that oath or instructions with regard to sentencing. This problem did not arise in Witt because the juror there
was challenged and excluded on the basis of an apparent conflict between her scruples and her ability to pass impartially on the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. 43 The juror needed no particular understanding of Florida law to be able to respond to such an inquiry; indeed, her answer would doubtless have been the same in any state that
imposed the death penalty. But an inquiry about the juror's ability to
do her duty at the sentencing phase of the proceeding would have been
41. 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985).
42. 105 S. Ct. at 850 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980) (emphasis deleted)).
43. 105 S. Ct. at 848.
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meaningless without an explanation of precisely what duty Florida law
would impose on her at such a hearing.
In the hope of reducing the role of federal courts in Witherspoon
litigation, the Court in Witt also ruled that the decision of a state trial
judge holding a venireman excludable under Witherspoon is a "factual" finding, and thus entitled to a "presumption of correctness"
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 44 That holding, far from simplifying
Witherspoon litigation, is certain to embroil federal courts in a vast
new array of legal and factual issues that must be resolved in order to
determine the applicability of section 2254(d). For example:
(i) In Witt, as is ordinarily the case, the state judge gave no explanation of his decision to exclude the disputed juror; the Supreme
Court, noting that a state judge is presumed to have appli~d the correct legal standard,45 reasoned that the judge must have implicitly
made the factual findings which were necessary as a matter of law to
exclude a juror. 46 But the cases cited by the Court for that presumption are expressly limited to situations in which the nature of the correct legal standard is not a matter of controversy or dispute. 47 There
have in fact been relatively few disputes about the standard for excluding a juror, like the juror in Witi, whose scruples might interfere with
his ability to decide on guilt or innocence. But disputes regarding the
meaning of Witherspoon with regard to sentencing have been legion,48
and Witt alters but does not eliminate those controversies. Once a
federal habeas corpus petitioner identifies a colorable legal dispute as
to the standard for excluding a disputed juror, the "presumption of
correctness" relied on in Witt would simply evaporate.
44. 105 S. Ct. at 853-55. Section 2254 provides that, except under certain specified circumstances, in a federal habeas corpus proceeding "a determination after a hearing on the merits of a
factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written
finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be
correct .... " 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982).
45. 105 S. Ct. at 856.
46. 105 S. Ct. at 855-57.
47. The Court relied expressly on Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Townsend made
clear that the presumption that the state court applied the correct legal standard, and thus the
presumed existence offactfinding by the state judge, was appropriate only when the relevant legal
principles were both clear and undisputed:
Unless the district judge can be reasonably certain that the state trier would have granted
relief if he had believed petitioner's allegations, he cannot be sure that the state trier in
denying relief disbelieved these allegations. If any combination of the facts alleged would
prove a violation of constitutional rights and the issue of law on those facts presents a difficult or novel problem for decision, any hypothesis as to the relevant factual determinations
of the state trier involves the purest speculation. The federal court cannot exclude the possibility that the trial judge believed facts which showed a deprivation of constitutional rights
and yet (erroneously) concluded that relief should be denied.
372 U.S. at 315-16. The other cases cited in Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 856, simply quote and rely on
Townsend. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 433 (1983); LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410
U.S. 690, 694-95 (1973).
48. See text at note 40 supra.
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(ii) In order to ascertain the legal standard applied by the state
judge in Witt, the Supreme Court referred to the questions asked and
instructions given to other veniremen by the trial judge.49 ln future
cases prosecutors and defense counsel alike will have to scrutinize the
state judge's questions and instructions to determine what the judge
believed the applicable legal standard to be. A defendant need not
establish with certainty that the state judge was guilty of legal error;
once the parties identify any serious question regarding the legal standard the judge was applying, it becomes impossible to infer from the
judge's action in excluding a juror what facts he must have found in
order to have taken that action. Where a prosecutor has directly or
indirectly argued for an incorrect interpretation of the law, any possibility that the trial judge may have accepted that argument will ordinarily defeat the section 2254(d) presumption.
(iii) Although Witt emphasizes that demeanor may play an important role in a state judge's decision, it does not suggest that the section
2254(d) presumption of correctness could salvage a state court decision excluding a venireman whose actual answers clearly fell short of
the standard of Witt and Witherspoon. In Witt the defendant argued
that the statements of the disputed juror were insufficient to justify
exclusion because the juror had indicated only that her views would
"interfere" with her ability to pass on guilt or innocence; the defendant contended that the juror might have meant only that her views
would have made it unpleasant to sit as a juror, or created merely an
insubstantial problem. In rejecting this contention the Court noted
that, while the term "interfere" was ambiguous, one possible meaning
was to "create an [insurmountable] obstacle"; that ambiguity was one
which the trial judge was free to resolve on the basis of demeanor. 50
But this reliance on presumed demeanor evidence was appropriate
only because the term "interfere" was indeed ambiguous; the result
would presumably be different if a juror's literal testimony contained
no such ambiguity. Thus dispute about the terms used in both questions and answers must remain an important part of litigation under
Witt, just as it was, albeit in a somewhat different form, under
Witherspoon.
(iv) Witt's section 2254 analysis depends entirely on the presumed
existence of a legal analysis and factfinding on the part of a state judge
who articulated neither. The judge's silence in that particular case
may be understandable in view of the fact that the defense attorney
neither spught to question the disputed juror nor objected to her exclusion. Under those circumstances the Supreme Court believed that the
trial judge "was given no reason to think that elaboration was neces49. 105 S. Ct. at 856 & n.12.
50. 105 S. Ct. at 857.
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sary." 51 But this entire method of analysis would seem to be suspect if
a defendant objected to the exclusion of a disputed juror, and would
certainly be inappropriate if a defendant expressly requested that the
state judge explain the legal basis of his decision, or set forth any findings he was making regarding the meaning of the juror's statements.
Such requests would be entirely reasonable, since they would permit
the defendant to do precisely what the defendant failed to do in Witt:
ask further questions needed to "resolv[e] any ... ambiguities" 52 perceived by the trial judge. A trial judge's refusal to accede to such a
request and articulate the basis of his proposed decision would interfere with the defendant's ability to present his case at trial, and would
obstruct appellate review, as deliberately and effectively as if the trial
judge willfully destroyed the court reporter's notes of the voir dire
hearing.
(v) The decision in Witt correctly stressed the importance of the
role of defense counsel in questioning prospective jurors. Practical experience under Witherspoon has made it clear that jurors can easily be
led to give disqualifying answers by the use of carefully phrased prosecution questions; time and again answers obtained in this way have
been discredited by further questioning by defense counsel which
demonstrated that the views of the disputed juror fell well within the
protections of Witherspoon. 53 In light of that experience, a refusal by a
state judge to permit defense counsel to ask questions, or to ask additional questions to clarify responses obtained by a prosecutor, would
deny the defendant the fair and adequate hearing required by section
2254(d)(6).

This array of problems is typical of the sort of morass into which
the Supreme Court has repeatedly fallen when it has chosen to maximize a state's ability to impose the death penalty, rather than adopt a
clear rule of simple application. The decision in Gregg to avoid mandating any particular sentencing procedure54 committed the Supreme
Court to dealing on a case-by-case basis with every procedural and
evidentiary quirk that the various states might devise for imposing the
death penalty. Professor White's book provides a preview of some of
the many issues that will thus have to be resolved. 55
Decisions such as Gregg and Witt do not forsake entirely the constitutional principles that may be at issue, but relegate them to evaluation on a more fact specific, often individualized, basis. This may
51. 105 S. Ct. at 856.
52. 105 S. Ct. at 858.
53. See Schnapper, supra note 39, at 1015-32.
54. The Court has repeatedly emphasized its unwillingness "to say that there is any one right
way for a State to set up its capital sentencing scheme." Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464
(1984), and cases cited.
55. See particularly pp. 11-12 and pp. 203-63.
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avoid an immediate and major limitation on state practices, but in the
long term it spawns the sort of administrative problems that existed
under Witherspoon, and that seem certain to re-emerge under Witt.
The seemingly endless challenges to particular practices or death
sentences is thus, to some degree, a situation of the Court's own making. Had the Supreme Court in 1968 simply forbidden the exclusion
of jurors based on conscientious scruples, the entire body of capital
punishment litigation prompted by Witherspoon, and continued by
Witt, would never have emerged. Actual experience in states that
never sought to exclude scrupled jurors makes it clear that the abolition of such exclusions would not have prevented continued application of the death penalty..
The value of a broader approach, casting aside practices fraught
with constitutional problems rather than trying to delineate on a caseby-case basis precisely which actions are and are not constitutional, is
well illustrated by practical experience under Miranda v. Arizona. 56
As Professor White notes, Miranda adopts a per se rule regarding the
conduct of custodial interrogations; rather than become embroiled in
individualized disputes about what police officers should say to suspects, the Supreme Court in 1966 spelled out precisely what warning
was to be given, and what answers were to be deemed sufficient to
preclude further questioning. To grasp the practical importance of
that per se approach, one need only reflect for a moment on what
would have occurred if the Court in Miranda, as occurred in Witt, had
declined to mandate any set language, choosing instead to permit
every police officer and prosecutor to draft his or her own warning.
Free to fashion whatever admonitions they pleased, the states would
have devised an enormous variety of statements calculated to provide
as little information as possible about either the right to counsel or the
privilege against self-incrimination. Under such circumstances judicial administration of the principles of Miranda would have beeri a
nightmare.
·
Whatever the original rationale of this prophylactic rule, the Court
now correctly regards simplicity as the preeminent virtue of Miranda.
In Berkemer v. McCarty 57 the Court unanimously held that Miranda
should be applied to interrogations of suspects being held on misdemeanor charges, reasoning that the implementation of a distinction
between suspected misdemeanants and suspected felons would confront the courts with byzantine doctrinal problems, and "seriously ...
impair the simplicity and clarity of the holding of Miranda. " 58 The
Court emphasized, as it did in Oregon v. Elstad, 59 its belief that the
56.
57.
58.
59.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
468 U.S. 420 (1984).
468 U.S. at 432.
105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
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"bright line" established by Miranda 60 had been effective in eliminating much litigation regarding the voluntariness of particular
confessions. 61
Professor White praises Miranda for drawing a "bright line," and
suggests that a number of peripheral issues regarding the scope of Miranda should be resolved by the adoption of additional per se rules
(pp. 163-84). Whatever the merits of these proposals with regard to
Miranda, this is an approach that warrants serious consideration in
the resolution of issues related to capital punishment. Decisions such
as Witherspoon and Witt, which attempt to draw unworkably fine lines
in a complex legal world, will inevitably generate an enormous
number of colorable claims of legal error. Shifting the standards in
favor of the prosecutor, as was apparently the purpose of Witt, does
little to alleviate these administrative problems; increasing the proportion of veniremen who are arguably excludable does not necessarily
clarify the distinction between those veniremen and others who cannot
be excluded for cause. However much the Court may modify constitutional doctrine to make it easier to impose the death penalty, prosecutors are still going to try to exceed or evade any restrictions whose
substance is not crystal clear. Similarly, the absence of specific Courtmandated procedures under Gregg has had precisely the result the
Court foresaw would occur if the per se approach of Miranda were
abandoned, prompting a welter of litigation creating on a case-by-case
basis "an elaborate set of rules, interlaced with exceptions and subtle
distinctions. " 62
Rules such as those in Witherspoon and Witt are more than just an
administrative burden on the courts. As such rules become more complex and fact-intensive, their correct application in specific cases will
depend increasingly on the quality of representation that defendants
have, particularly at trial. Thus the effect of Witherspoon and Witt is
not simply to allow the state to execute some defendants who would
not be sentenced to death were the Court to forbid the exclusion of
60. Elstad, IOS S. Ct. at 1292 n.1 ("bright line"), 1296 ("A subsequent administration of
Miranda warnings to a suspect who has [earlier] given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement."), 1298 ("[I]n evaluating the voluntariness of his statements •.• [t]he fact that a suspect
chooses to speak after being informed of his rights is, of course, highly probative.").
61. The Court explained in Berkemer:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not
coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing ... and as much as possible to free courts
from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether
particular confessions were voluntary....
We do not suggest that compliance with Miranda conclusively establishes the voluntariness of a subsequent confession. But cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was "compelled" despite the fact that the law
enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.
468 U.S. at 433 & n.20.
62. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 432.
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any jurors on account of religious or conscientious scruples. In the
administration of a complex rule, some defendants who might have
received the death penalty despite the inclusion on their juries of all
scrupled jurors will, because of errors in complying with Witherspoon
and Witt, receive only life sentences, while individuals who would
have been sentenced to life imprisonment had those decisions been adhered to will, because of unavoidable errors in application, be sentenced to die. Thus the Court, by adopting complex fact-intensive
rules, introduces into the sentencing process precisely the type of arbitrariness that Furman and even Gregg condemn.
The adoption of clear-line prophylactic rules would also have another enormously desirable consequence. The increasing number of
individuals under sentence of death - today well over a thousand has complicated the likely consequences and significance of any constitutional decision. The acceptance of any new constitutional argument,
or even the conscientious enforcement of a well-established doctrine, is
likely to call into question the sentences or convictions of literally hundreds_of the nation's most hardened and dangerous criminals. It
would blink reality to pretend that the Supreme Court is not seriously
concerned about the retroactive impact of its decisions in this area. In
his discussion of mounting evidence that death-qualified juries - juries from which certain opponents of the death penalty have been excluded - are significantly biased in favor of conviction, Professor
White notes that a Supreme Court decision sustaining his argument
would, if retroactive, have a great impact on the administration of justice, calling into question the convictions of literally thousands of inmates, not only those under sentence of death, but many if not most of
the convicted murderers in the nation (p. 9). When, following the
publication of White's book, the Supreme Court took up the question
of whether death-qualified juries were impermissibly conviction prone,
the problem of retroactivity was emphasized not only in the brief for
the state, 63 but also in questions from the bench at oral argument. 64
The Court held in Lockhart v. McCree 65 not only that the defendant
had failed to prove that death-qualified juries were conviction prone,
but also that the Court would refuse even to consider in any future
case additional information that tended to prove that such juries were
biased. The breadth of the decision undoubtedly reflected a determination by the majority to assure that no subsequent empirical study
could result in the release of many of the nation's most dangerous
criminals.
The problem that White recognizes with regard to convictionproneness is present, albeit in a less extreme form, in every case involv63. Brief for Petitioner at 20-21, Lockhart v. Mccree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
64. 54 U.S.L.W. 3475-76 (oral arguments, Lockhart v. McCree).
65. 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
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ing a challenge to the procedures by which a state imposes the death
penalty. In a very real sense the most important precedent influencing
the Court's present decisions in capital punishment cases may be, not
Furman or Gregg, but Linkletter v. Walker, 66 which establishes the
principles for determining whether a constitutional decision will be applied retroactively. Whatever the merits of Linkletter and its progeny,
the specter of retroactivity has an intolerable and increasingly distortive effect on capital punishment appeals. When the Court manipulates
its constitutional decisions to avoid reducing or calling into question
the sentences of large numbers of inmates on whom the states have
already imposed the death penalty, it decides that future defendants
who would not be sentenced to death under a constitutional scheme
will have to die in order to facilitate the execution of past defendants.
The ultimate premise of such an approach is that it is better to kill
some defendants who do not deserve to die than to spare the lives of
some defendants who may indeed deserve that sentence. That is a
morally and constitutionally horrendous result.
If, as appears to be the case, the specter of retroactivity is beginning to affect the Court's decisions on the merits of constitutional issues, then the time may have come to reconsider the standards the
Court uses to determine the retroactive effect of a decision. In at least
some instances this problem, as well as the administrative difficulties
discussed earlier, can be resolved by adopting bright-line prophylactic
rules, the sort of rules that, because they are framed to prevent rather
than merely define constitutional violations, are not ordinarily retroactive in application. Such an approach may hold out the most realistic
prospect for increasing the coherence, reliability, and predictability of
capital sentencing systems. Such an approach may also provide a basis for the Court ultimately to assess whether the best of such systems
can, in operation, meet minimal constitutional standards.
66. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).

